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The Role of a Chief Justice in Canada
Peter W Hogg*
Professor Hogg describes the duties of ChiefJustices in Canadian courts, and explains
that the effective discharge of their many administrative functions plays a significant





IV. Administration of Court
V. Protection of Institutional Independence
Conclusion
Introduction
Professor William R. Lederman, in the course of his long,
productive, and brilliant career, influenced the way we think about
most areas of Canadian constitutional law. His influence on
scholarship, practice, and doctrine has been immense. One of his
early contributions was a massive two-part article entitled "The
Independence of the Judiciary," which appeared in the Canadian
Bar Review in 1956.' That article is still universally recognized as
the seminal work on the topic. It continues to be cited frequently,
and later writers have had to be content to nibble at the edges of
the topic. This article is one of those nibbles.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I
acknowledge the research assistance of Margot Ferguson, LL.B. 1993. I also
acknowledge the help of my colleague, Garry Watson, and of Jeannie Thomas,
Executive Director of the Canadian Judicial Council, both of whom made useful
comments on an earlier version of the paper. An earlier version was delivered at
a seminar for the Canadian Judicial Council on 24 March 1993, and I benefitted
from discussions that took place there.
1. W.R. Lederman, "The Independence of the Judiciary" (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev.
769 (Part 1) and 1139 (Part 2).
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Professor Lederman never turned his attention to the role of a
Chief Justice in the maintenance of the independence of the
judiciary. Indeed, very little has been written on the topic by
anyone.2 And yet it is the Chief Justice of each superior court
who manages the relationship between the court and the govern-
ment which is responsible for the administration of justice in that
jurisdiction. It is that relationship which carries the most obvious
risks to the independence of the judiciary. The Chief Justice,
therefore, has a unique responsibility, which is not shared with the
puisne judges, for safeguarding the independence of the judiciary.
In this article, I will first describe the office of Chief Justice of a
superior court,3 and then I will address the issue of judicial
independence.
I. Appointment
The Chief Justice of Canada,4 the Chief Justice of the Federal
Court of Canada,5 and the Chief Justices of the superior courts of
the provinces6 are all appointed by the Governor in Council -
that is, by the federal Cabinet. In law, the appointment process for
a Chief Justice is the same as for a puisne judge of the same court.
It is often claimed, however, that in practice there is a slight
difference in the process; the recommendation to Cabinet for the
appointment of a Chief Justice is made by the Prime Minister,
2. The only study that I could find was A. Linden, et al., "The Status and Role
of the Chief Justice in Canada" (Study commissioned by the Canadian Institute for
the Administration of Justice, 1981) [unpublished]. This proved to be a very useful
source.
3. The scope of this article is confined to Chief Justices of the superior courts in
Canada. I do not deal with Associate Chief Justices that exist in most of the
superior courts, or with Chief Judges of the Provincial Courts. However, most of
what I have to say is applicable to them.
4. Supreme CourtAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4(2) [hereinafter Supreme CourtAct].
5. Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 5(4) [hereinafter Federal Court Act].
6. The mode of appointment of the judges of the superior, district, and county
courts of the provinces is stipulated by the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31
Vict., c. 3, s. 96 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867].
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while the recommendation for the appointment of a puisne judge
is made by the Minister of Justice.7
The qualifications for appointment as a Chief Justice are, in law,
no different from those for a puisne judge of the same court. In
the case of the Supreme Court of Canada, the appointee must be
either a judge of the superior court of a province or a member of
the bar of a province of at least ten years' standing In the case
of the Federal Court of Canada, the requirement is the same.9 In
the case of the superior courts of the provinces, the appointee
must be a member of the bar of the province of at least ten years'
standing." In practice, however, Chief Justices are rarely
appointed directly from the bar, but usually from the ranks of the
puisne judges." As well, of course, in practice, a Chief Justice
must possess qualities of leadership, organization, and diplomacy
that are not always essential to the task of being a judge.'
As will be elaborated later in this article, the Chief Justice of
each superior court has the power to assign judges to particular
cases. This includes the power to assign himself or herself to a
particular case. The Chief Justice also controls the list of cases,
including the order in which they are to be tried or heard and the
courtrooms in which they are to be tried or heard. As will be
elaborated later, it is a constitutional prerequisite of judicial
7. P.H. Russell, The Judiciary in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987)
at 112.
8. Supreme Court Act, s. 5.
9. Federal Court Act, s. 5(5).
10. Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-l, s. 3 [hereinafter Judges Act]. The statutory
requirement of ten years' standing supplements the constitutional requirement that
judges be selected from the bar of the province. See Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 97
and 98.
11. In the case of the Supreme Court of Canada, all but the first of the Chief
Justices have been appointed from within the Court.
12. It goes without saying that Chief Justices have no power to select the new
judges to fill vacancies on their courts. These vacancies are filled by the Governor
in Council, acting under the powers referred to above, supra notes 4-6. The federal
Minister of Justice normally consults a Chief Justice before making an appointment
to the court of the Chief Justice.
19 Queen's Law Journal
independence that these functions be carried out by or under the
control of judges and not of the government."
II. Tenure
Chief Justices hold office on the same basis as puisne judges;
that is, they hold office "during good behaviour," and are subject
to removal only by a joint address of the Senate and House of
Commons.14 There is mandatory retirement at age 75.I5'How-
ever, the Chief Justice of a provincial superior court may
relinquish the office after five years and revert to being a puisne
judge. 6
Chief Justices play a unique role in securing the tenure of
superior court judges through their membership in the Canadian
Judicial Council. The Canadian Judicial Council is chaired by the
Chief Justice of Canada, and comprises all Chief Justices and
Associate Chief Justices of the superior courts. 7 As well as
certain coordinating and educative functions, the duty of the
Council is to inquire into complaints against superior court judges
and to report to the federal Minister of Justice. If the Council
recommends that a judge be removed from office and Cabinet
agrees, then (if the judge does not resign), a joint address of the
13. See Valente v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 [hereinafter Valente] at 708-709. See also
text accompanying notes 20-22, below. The constitutional requirement applies to
all courts of criminal jurisdiction and stems from s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 [hereinafter Charter].
14. Supreme Court Act, s. 9(1); Federal Court Act, s. 8(1). The tenure of judges of
the superior courts of the provinces is stipulated by the Constitution Act, 1867,
s. 99. For analysis, see P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1992) at s. 7.1(c).
15. Supreme Court Act, s. 9(2); Federal Court Act, s. 8(2), as am. by S.C. 1987,
c. 21, s. 7. The retirement age of judges of the superior courts of the provinces is
stipulated by the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 99.
16. Judges Act, s. 32.
17. Ibid. at Part II. All provinces except Prince Edward Island have established
provincial judicial councils, with power to investigate complaints of judicial
misbehaviour against judges appointed by the province. The composition of these
bodies varies considerably from province to province.
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two Houses of Parliament is required under the Constitution"8 in
order to carry out the recommendation.
III. Payment
The salaries of superior court judges, including Chief Justices,
are "fixed and provided" by the federal Judges Act.19 Each Chief
Justice is paid more than the puisne judges on the same court.
IV. Administration of Court
The most obvious way in which a Chief Justice differs from
other judges is that the Chief Justice is responsible for
administering the operations of his or her court.
In carrying out this function, a Chief Justice is subject to
external constraints. The most obvious and important of them is
lack of access to public funds. The Chief Justice can only request
funds from the Minister of Justice (or Attorney General), and
hope that the Minister will succeed in persuading his or her
Cabinet colleagues, including the Minister of Finance (or
Treasurer), that the full amount requested should be included in
the estimates for the Department of Justice (or Attorney General).
The estimates have to be approved by the Parliament (or
Legislature), of course, and they will have to be defended from
Opposition criticism by the Minister of Justice.
Once funds have been appropriated, the ability of a Chief
Justice to spend them is severely constrained. The buildings,
equipment, books, and other physical requirements of the court
are all supplied by the Minister of Justice, who must obey the
same procurement rules that bind other departments of govern-
18. Supra note 10.
19. JudgesAct, ss. 9-22. Section 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867provides that the
salaries of superior, district, and county court judges must be "fixed and provided
by the Parliament of Canada."
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ment. The personnel of the court are public servants within the
Department of Justice. Their appointment, job descriptions, and
other terms and conditions of employment are all governed by the
same rules as apply to the public service generally, including, in
many cases, the provisions of collective agreements. Their career
prospects are not confined to the courts, and their ultimate loyalty
may be owed to Ministers and senior officials in government
rather than to the Chief Justice in whose courts they are serving
for the time being.
In summary, the Chief Justice may be unable to obtain the
resources that he or she is convinced are required for the efficient
operation of the court. With the resources that are available, the
Chief Justice may be unable to secure the personnel, facilities, and
services that he or she is convinced would be best for the efficient
operation of the court. An analogy may be drawn to the dean of
the law faculty of a university, who must endure the same absence
of power to carry out his or her responsibilities. This does not
mean that a Chief Justice (or a law dean) is necessarily an
ineffective administrator. But it does mean that the ability of the
Chief Justice to engage the sympathetic cooperation of the
Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister is of critical impor-
tance. This is the part of the work of the Chief Justice that carries
risks to the independence of the judiciary.
V. Protection of Institutional Independence
In Valente,2" the Supreme Court of Canada held that "institu-
tional independence" was an essential element of the independence
of the judiciary. This required that a court be independent of
government "with respect to matters of administration bearing
directly on the exercise of its judicial function."21 Those matters
of administration included the "assignment of judges, sittings of
20. Supra note 13.
21. Ibid. at 708.
P.W. Hogg
the court, and court lists."22 According to Valente, the manage-
ment of the docket of a court is essential to judicial independence.
The Chief Justice, or other judges or officials acting under his or
her supervision, must prepare court lists, determine the order in
which cases are to be tried or heard, and assign judges and court-
rooms to the cases.
These tasks require resources. These resources must be obtained
by the Chief Justice from the Minister of Justice. The problem
which the Chief Justice has is that the judiciary has nothing to
give in return. The most obvious and valuable consideration for
government funding and cooperation would be the rendering of
decisions that are pleasing to the government. That cannot be
promised or delivered by the Chief Justice, because it would be
the most serious breach of the independence of the judiciary
imaginable. Any partiality to government would involve an
abandonment of the rule of law, which requires (among other
things) that judges be even-handed in resolving disputes between
Crown and subject. Thus, the Chief Justice must deal with the
Minister and the Deputy at the same time as the judges of the
court of the Chief Justice (including the Chief Justice himself or
herself, of course) are doing things that are displeasing to the
government. Judges acquit defendants who are charged with crime
by the Crown; they award damages and other civil remedies
against the Crown; and they strike down legislation, regulations,
and administrative acts that were drafted, made, or performed by
the Crown. Some of these things are bound to be resented by
some ministers and officials in the government. Therefore, when
the Chief Justice of the court meets with representatives of the
government, the Chief Justice does not occupy a position of
tangible strength.
The relationship between the Chief Justice and the Minister of
Justice (or Attorney General) is further complicated by the fact
that the Minister of Justice is the Minister who is responsible for
conducting litigation on behalf of the Crown. This means that the
Minister of Justice, acting through his or her Crown attorneys (or
22. Ibid. at 709.
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prosecutors) and his or her civil counsel, is far and away the
principal litigant in every jurisdiction. It is anomalous that the
Minister who is the principal litigant in the courts is also the
Minister who provides the courts with their support staff and
services and who presents and defends the budget for the courts in
the Parliament or Legislature.
Within a system of responsible, parliamentary government,
there are serious limits to the degree of financial and
administrative independence that can be accorded the judiciary.
Obviously, only the Parliament or Legislature can authorize the
expenditure of money, and a Minister of the Crown must be
responsible for defending the budget of the courts in the legislative
chamber. In principle, as well, a Minister should be responsible for
the funding of the courts, because it is the government that is
accountable to the electorate for problems in the court system
caused by underfunding. Nor is it reasonable to demand that the
courts should always receive every cent that the Chief Justice
believes is necessary. It is right and proper that the government
should ration the available funds among many worthy objects, and
the courts cannot be immune from that process.
A Chief Justice is not a member of the Parliament or Legislature
or a member of the Cabinet, and is not accountable to the elector-
ate for problems in the court system. Nor could a Chief Justice
make direct representations to the Parliament or Legislature (as
occurs in many jurisdictions of the United States) without
becoming involved in the political process, which would give rise
to serious perceptions of a lack of independence from political
parties and from government. It seems to be both unavoidable and
desirable that the Chief Justice should have to persuade a Minister
of the fiscal requirements of the court, because the Minister is then
able to carry the brief in Cabinet and in the Parliament or
Legislature.
One possible reform would be to confer responsibility over the
courts on a minister other than the Minister of Justice (or
Attorney General). In this way, the role of funding and staffing
the courts would be separated from the role of prosecuting
criminal and civil cases before the courts. Here, however, it is
important to balance practical concerns with theoretical concerns
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about judicial independence. I say theoretical concerns because
there is no evidence that the Minister of Justice (or Attorney
General) uses his or her position to pressure the courts to favour
the government side in criminal or civil cases. The practical
concerns that arise in my mind are that a minister other than the
Minister of Justice (or Attorney General) is likely to be less senior,
less influential, and less committed to the rule of law than the
Minister of Justice (or Attorney General). A shift to another
portfolio might leave the courts with a weaker champion in
Cabinet and in Parliament or the Legislature. The courts would be
more exposed to competing claims on public funds, and their own
level of funding might suffer.
In the federal jurisdiction, an attempt has been made to give the
courts a greater degree of institutional independence. The Minister
of Justice remains responsible for the courts. But the Judges Act
establishes an official called the Commissioner for Federal Judicial
Affairs, who has "the rank and status of a deputy head of a
department" and who is responsible for preparing budgetary
submissions for the Federal Court, the Tax Court, and the
Canadian Judicial Council, and for providing premises, equipment,
and other supplies and services to those courts and the Council.23
In the case of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Judges Act confers
these functions on the Registrar of the Court, who also has the
status of a deputy head.24 In this way, the officials who provide
support services to the federal courts are separated from those in
the Department of Justice who conduct the litigation of the
government." As well, the Supreme Court Act confers on the
Registrar of the Court the duty to "superintend the officers, clerks
and employees appointed to the Court," and the Act makes this
duty "[s]ubject to the direction of the Chief Justice."26 In this
way, the Act seeks to locate the legal authority over the staff of
the Supreme Court of Canada within the Court.
23. Judges Act, ss. 73 and 74.
24. Ibid., s. 75.
25. Both the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs and the Registrar of the
Supreme Court report to the Minister of Justice.
26. Supreme Court Act, s. 15.
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A few provinces have established a separate division of court
administration within their departments of justice,z' and some
provincial statutes also require court staff to work under the
direction of the Chief Justice.28 These measures, like the federal
measures, do reinforce the institutional independence of the
judiciary. However, no Canadian jurisdiction has removed the
funding of the courts from the budgetary responsibility of the
Minister of Justice or exempted the funding of the courts from the
regular governmental process of budgetary control. Nor has any
Canadian jurisdiction excluded the personnel of the courts from
the rules of the public service on recruitment, classification,
promotion, remuneration, and like matters. Thus, in no Canadian
jurisdiction can it be said that the theoretical concerns about
judicial independence have been eliminated. In every jurisdiction,
the Chief Justice is dependent upon the Minister of Justice (or
Attorney General) for the funding of the courts of the Chief
Justices, and in some degree upon the Minister of Justice or other
Government Ministers or officials for the courtrooms, equipment,
supplies, and services that are needed to operate the courts.
In 1981, Jules Deschenes, who was then Chief Justice of the
Superior Court of Quebec, wrote a report entitled Masters in their
Ovn House,29 which proposed a series of radical reforms to fully
secure the independence of the judiciary. Relying on American
models, Deschenes C.J. recommended that the courts should
present their own budgetary estimates directly to the Speaker of
the House of Commons or Legislative Assembly. The estimates
would be examined by a legislative committee on judicial affairs
before which the Chief Justices (or other spokespersons for the
27. See P.S. Millar and C. Baar, Judicial Administration in Canada (Kingston:
McGill-Queen's Press, 1981) at 59.
28. See E. Colvin, "The Executive and the Independence of the Judiciary" (1986)
51 Sask. L. Rev. 229 at 245.
29. J. Deschenes, Masters in their Own House (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council,
1981). The report proposed three stages of reform - consultation, decision-sharing,
and independence - of which only the final stage is described here. The Report
of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Independence of the Judiciary
(Ottawa: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985) at 40, stopped short of endorsing the
final stage of the Deschenes proposals.
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judiciary) would appear. Upon approval by the committee, the
judicial estimates would be automatically included in the budget
of the Minister of Justice. In this way, the funding of the courts
would be exempt from treasury board constraints and all other
internal governmental rules of financial management. The funding
of the courts would not be compared with the funding of other
areas of government until all the estimates were presented to the
Parliament or Legislature for approval.
As I indicated earlier in this article, in my view such a system
would be an abdication by government of its responsibility for an
important part of the administration of justice. In the United
States, a real debate on spending estimates takes place within the
Congress or Legislature, and the appropriations that emerge from
the legislative process, as well as any related taxing proposals, may
well differ from what was initially proposed. But this is not the
case in Canada, where the conventions of responsible
parliamentary government virtually preclude the Parliament or
Legislature from modifying the fiscal measures proposed by the
government. In Canada, the effective review of spending proposals
takes place within the government before the estimates are placed
before the Parliament or Legislature. To exempt the funding of the
courts from the Treasury Board or other internal governmental
controls would place the administration of the courts in a
privileged position enjoyed by no other part of government.
That privileged position was the goal of the Deschenes
proposals, which were premised on the proposition that the
independence of the judiciary was a value to which competing
fiscal considerations should yield. That is obviously a tenable
position, but I do not share it. In my view, since only elected
Ministers can be politically accountablk for problems caused by the
underfunding of the courts, it is elected Ministers who ought to
determine funding levels. The funding of the courts has a powerful
political constituency in the organized legal profession. There is
also the interest of the press and the Opposition in the admin-
istration of justice, especially criminal justice. And the requirement
in the Charter that a person charged with an offence must be tried
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within a reasonable time3" adds legal weight to the political forces
at play.3 The democratic process thus seems unlikely to produce
major problems of underfunding for the courts.
However, even if that conclusion is too optimistic, it seems
wrong in principle to me that the courts alone should be exempt
from the competition among worthy claimants for their share of
scarce public revenues. It is the task of an elected government to
assign priorities to the various claims on the public purse, and to
take political responsibility for those priorities. The administration
of the courts should not be exempt from that process.
Conclusion
A Chief Justice is unlike a puisne judge, not only because of
membership in the Canadian Judicial Council, but also because of
his or her responsibility for the administration of the court. That
responsibility is not accompanied by control over the amount of
funding that the court receives. The Chief Justice must persuade
the Minister of Justice (or Attorney General) of the requirements
of the court, and must hope that the Minister will succeed in
obtaining desired funds through the internal budgetary process of
the government and through the legislative process. Once funds
have been obtained, the Chief Justice must rely upon government
procedures regarding recruitment and procurement to obtain the
personnel, premises, equipment, and services that are needed to
operate the court. These are all constraints on the institutional
independence of the court of the Chief Justice, but they are
constraints that are difficult to remove without fundamental
changes to the system of parliamentary government in Canada.
30. Charter, s. 11(b).
31. See R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, which held that a trial must be held
within six to eight months of committal. It was followed by the staying or
withdrawing of 47,000 criminal charges in Ontario alone. The publicity that was
given to this virtual amnesty for many persons accused of crime was followed by
prompt increases by the Attorney General in the resources available to the courts.
The case and its aftermath are discussed in Hogg, supra note 14 at s. 49.8(e).
P.W. Hogg
It is realistic to acknowledge that a Chief Justice is inescapably
dependent upon government for the resources needed to operate
the court. Within those important constraints, however, the Chief
Justice must be independent of government "with respect to
matters of administration bearing directly on the exercise of [the
Court's] judicial function."32 The most important role of the
Chief Justice is to make sure that the ineluctable reliance upon
government for resources does not infect the independence of the
judicial function.
19 Queen's Law Journal
32. See Valente, supra note 13.
